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Article 2

Qual: A Survey of Medical Malpractice Tort Reform

A SURVEY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
TORT REFORM
SHIRLEY QUALt

The medical malpractice insurance "crisis of availability" of the seventies has resurfaced as the "crisis of affordability" of the eighties.
This Article surveys the various tort reform measures which have been
proposed or enacted by thefederalgovernment and various state legislatures. Ms. Qual also examines the recent Minnesota tort reform
legislation and concludes that although it is a realistic solution to the
problem, it falls short of its goal offully addressing the causes of the
"crisis" by neglecting the crucial issue of physician discipline.
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INTRODUCTION

The medical malpractice crisis stunned the medical community, insurers, and the public for the first time in the early
1970's.1 The crisis was characterized by drastically increased
medical malpractice premiums for physicians, 2 increased fre4
quency and severity of claims, 3 and increased damage awards.
1. See Defensive Medicine and Medical Malpractice, 1984: Hearing before the Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1984) (statement of Elvoy
Raines, American College of Obstetricians and Gynocologists). Mr. Raines, a professional liability expert, reported to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources on July 10, 1984, that 80% of all medical malpractice lawsuits filed between
1935 and 1975 were filed in the last five years of that 40 year period. Id.
2. In mid-1975, physicians' and surgeons' insurance premiums were 100%
higher than the previous year. See The Problems of Insuring Medical Malpractice: Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Labor & Public Welfare, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 188 (1975).
3. In 1974, the St. Paul Companies estimated that the amount of claims they
would receive in 1975 would increase 225% based on their annual claims growing
each year from 2,538 claims logged against their company in 1970. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE
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At its peak in 1975, insurers were so shocked by this activity
that they began to withdraw rapidly from the market of insuring health care providers, who had suddenly become high-risk
insureds. 5 Insurers still providing coverage in the medical
malpractice area responded to this crisis by raising their premi7
ums. 6 Physicians and hospitals, in turn, increased their fees.
State legislatures responded quickly. From 1975 through
1976, every state legislature made some attempt at tort reform
to curtail medical malpractice claims. 8 Whether these reforms
had any effect on medical malpractice litigation or insurance
costs is debatable. The "crisis," however, seemed to pass out
1984-85; PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THIE 80's, REPORTS 1-3, at 5. [hereinafter cited as

AMA REPORT 1-3].
4. Million-dollar verdicts increased from three in 1975 to over 285 between

1979 and 1984. Hirsch, Malpractice Crisis of the '80's, LEGAL

ASPECTS OF MED. PRAC.,

Oct. 1985, at 11.
5. See Sheehan, The M1Iedical lalpractice Crisis in Insurance: How it Happened and
Some Proposed Solutions, 11 F. 80 (1975).
6. Malpractice premiums for doctors and hospitals rose from $61 million in

1960 to $1 billion in 1975. T.

LOMBARDI, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE:

A

LEG-

ISLATOR'S VIEW 1 (1978).

For a state-by-state summary of premium rates in 1975, see
Sheehan, supra note 5, at 80.
7. Between 1975 and 1982, malpractice insurance premiums rose roughly 73%,
while the cost of physicians' services rose 92%, and the cost of a hospital room rose
130%. P. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS:
ANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 1-12 (1982) (Rand Corp. Inst. for Civil Justice
Study) (copy on file at the William Mitchell Law Review office).
8. The following quotation summarizes the response of state legislatures:
In 1975, medical malpractice problems reached crisis proportions in many
states . . . . As a result, 52 states and territories passed remedial legislation
in a two-year period beginning in 1975 and ending in 1976. It is difficult to
recall a problem in the history of the United States which generated more
state legislation in such a short period of time.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (NAIC), MALPRACTICE CLAIMS,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLOSED CLAIMS,

1975-78, at 3 (Sept. 1980) (copy on file at the

William Mitchell Law Review office). See generally Grossman, State-by-State Summary of

Legislative Activities on Vedical Malpractice, A

LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ISSUE 12 (D. Warren & R. Merritt eds. 1976) (containing comprehen-

sive list of state legislative efforts during this time period); Comment, An Analysis of
State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417.
The tort reform legislation is advocated by medical societies and insurers in an
effort to promote acturial certainty for the insurance industry. The reforms allegedly
reduce the number of medical malpractice suits and lower damage awards and attorneys' fees, providing additional cost savings to insurers. These cost reductions are
theoretically passed on to society, resulting in lower insurance premiums for phyisicians and consequently, lowering health care costs to society. The reforms, however, have not proved to be effective, and have not achieved these goals. See, e.g.,
AMA REPORT 2, supra note 3, at 13; Note, California's Aledical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829, 846 & n.102 (1979).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1986

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 2
BY7LLIAM MIIITCHELL LA 11"REVIEW

[Vol. 12

of the public eye-until today. '
This Article summarizes the history and potential causes of
the medical malpractice crisis. It explores various tort reform
methods employed by state legislatures attempting to alleviate
pressures brought on by the 1975 medical malpractice crisis,
and reviews the effects of tort reform on medical malpractice
litigation. Current Minnesota law is discussed, followed by an
analysis of the newly enacted legislation. Proposed national
legislation is explained, followed by the author's conclusion.
The purpose of this Article is to survey the use of, and evaluate
the effectiveness of, "crisis" legislation enacted by other states,
in order to provide insight for future attempts to do the same
in Minnesota.
I.

THE "MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS"-PAST AND PRESENT

A.

History

The first medical negligence suit in the United States was
recorded in 1794.10 It was not until the 1930's, however, that
the number of medical malpractice suits began to grow," l and
it was not until after World War II that the volume of claims
began to increase steadily.' 2 This increase did not achieve national attention until the early 1970's when its growth rate was
3
so alarming that the phenomenon was dubbed a "crisis."'
This medical malpractice insurance dilemma became known as
9. See

WOLFE, BERGMAN & SILVER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE NEED FOR Disci-

NOT TORT REFORM 1 (public citizen health research group report)
[hereinafter cited as THE NEED FOR DISCIPLINARY REFORM]. The authors state:
Just as it did during the last malpractice crisis ten years ago, organized
medicine has succeeded in diverting attention away from the issue of the
dangerously inadequate discipline of doctors by going all out to pass state
tort reform laws that will, in a variety of ways discipline injured patients or
the families of dead patients and their lawyers instead of the doctors.
Id.
10. Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90 (1794).
11. Hirsch, supra note 4, at 5.
12. This increase coincided with the increased availability of medical care and the
development of modern medicine and sophisticated technology. In post-war times,
more people were able to afford medical care, which increased the number of encounters that could lead to a lawsuit. Id.
13. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, long recognized as a leading
medical malpractice carrier, reported that in 1969 it had one claim per 23 physicians,
but in 1974, the ratio was one in every 10 physicians. In addition, in 1969 the average claim paid was $6,075, increasing to $12,534 in 1975-an increase of over 100%.
T. LOMBARDI, supra note 6, at 11; see also supra notes 1-5.
PLINARY REFORM,
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the "crisis of availability" because so many insurers withdrew
from the market that some physicians found it difficult to find
insurance at any price.' 4
The crisis reached its peak in 1975. l 5 State legislatures
across the country reacted swiftly, passing legislation curtailing
access to the courts' 6 and facilitating the means by which
health care providers could obtain liability coverage unavailable to them on the commercial market. 1 7 The "crisis" faded
from the public eye in the late 1970's and early 1980's,
although health care costs and malpractice litigation costs continued to rise.' 8
Today, the public, insurance companies, and physicians are
once again clamoring about a new medical malpractice crisis.19
This crisis has been entitled the "crisis of affordability- 20 because, unlike the the mid-1970's, medical malpractice insur21
ance is available, but its cost is claimed to be prohibitive.
14. According to an American Medical Association survey reported in the January 1976 Anerican Medical News, a significant number of physicians in about 25 states
were having difficulty obtaining liability insurance. Munch, Causes of the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Risks and Regulation, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 128 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978). Most notorious perhaps, was the New York
experience. Employers Insurance of Wausau, Wisconsin, pulled out of the market
after having underwritten the New York Medical Society's professional liability insurance for 25 years. Argonaut Insurance Company then agreed to provide coverage,
after raising rates 93.5%. In late 1974, Argonaut requested an additional 200% increase, and shortly thereafter abandoned the New York market. See AMA REPORT 1,
supra note 3, at 5.
15. AMA REPORT 2, supra note 3, at 13.
16. See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
17. Many states passed Joint Underwriting Association (JUA) legislation to furnish insurance to health care providers unable to obtain liability insurance on the
commercial market. These JUA's, usually required insurance companies registered
in the state to cooperate in supplying the liability insurance for these health care
providers until the open market once again made that insurance available. See
Munch, supra note 14, at 128.
18. Medical liability premiums increased by more than 80% between 1975 and
1983, reaching as much as $80,000 per year for physicians practicing high risk specialities. Hirsch, supra note 4, at 8.
19. See Middleton, The Medical Malpractice War, NAT'L LAwJ., Aug. 27, 1984, at 1,
col. 1.
20. See AMA REPORT 1, supra note 3, at 8.
21. In Minnesota, for example, the Minnesota Medical Insurance Exchange has
just published the projected average percentage increases for 1985 to be 28%. This
percentage has risen from 22% in 1984, 11.6% in 1983, 15% in 1982, and 15% in
1981. Minnesota Medical Insurance Exchange is a physician-owned insurance company founded in 1980. Minneapolis Star & Tribune,July 24, 1985, at IA, col. 3-4. Physician owned insurance companies were created in mid-1975, by doctors frustrated
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Causes

A great deal of controversy surrounds the cause and exist22
ence of the current medical malpractice insurance crisis.
One theory is that insurance companies have orchestrated the
phenomenon by manipulating the medical malpractice insurance market to eliminate competition among insurers. 2 3 The
with the alternatives-exorbitant premiums or the lack of available insurance. See
AMA REPORT 1, supra note 3, at 5.
Specialists are considering not practicing their specialties as a result of the expensive premiums and the likelihood of lawsuits. Young physicians are reportedly
not entering those fields for the same reasons. A Florida medical association survey
indicated that 25% of obstetricians in the state no longer deliver babies presumably
as a result of the risk. AMA REPORT 1, supra note 3, at 11. Wisconsin reports that
18% of obstetricians have stopped accepting high risk patients. STATE MEDICAL SOCIETY OF WISCONSIN, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 65 (Sept. 4, 1984) (copy on file at the William Mitchell Law

Review office).
22. As Senator Edward M. Kennedy said about the crisis of 1975: "It is all too
reminescent of what happened to gas and oil prices during the Arab embargo." See
T. LOMBARDI, supra note 6, at 1. An illustration of the theory that the insurance
industry has fabricated the "crisis" for its own profit is exemplified in a California
incident. See Carlova, How Doctors Forced a Malpractice Carrierto Refund $50 Million,
MED. ECON. 171-72 (1981). In 1976, physicians who obtained their medical malpractice insurance through Travelers Insurance Company on a contract with Southern
California Physicians Council, were forced to pay a 486% increase to cover the
higher losses Travelers expected in the future years. The physicians continued to
pay high rates through 1978 when it was discovered that Travelers had made an
enormous profit on its contract with the physicians. The Southern California Physicians Council demanded return of the excess premiums and ended up filing suit,
resulting in a return of $50,000,000 in premiums. Id. Cf Jones v. State Bd. of
Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 872, 555 P.2d 399, 412 (1976) ("It is argued that the Act is a
necessary legislative response to a 'crisis in medical insurance' in Idaho, but the record does not demonstrate any such 'crisis' "), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). But see
T. LOMBARDI, supra note 6, at 2, "[d]espite serious misgivings about the [insurance]
industry's response to the medical malpractice issue, the author in all fairness must
state that there is little evidence to substantiate the point of view that the crisis was
contrived for the benefit of the insurance company." Id.
23. "What we are witnessing is a manufactured crisis intended to bloat insurer
profits and reduce victims' rights." Perlman, Don't Confuse Me with the Facts, 22 TRIAL,
1986 at 5 (quotingJ. Robert Hunter, former Federal Insurance Administrator).
Major liability carriers stopped writing medical malpractice insurance in some
states during the 1975 crisis. See supra note 14. This selective withdrawal allocated
the medical malpractice market and eliminated competition among insurers, thus
causing rates to rise dramatically. Londrigan, The Medical Malpractice "Crisis," 21
TRIAL, 1985, at 23-24. See Bernier v. Burris, No. 85CH6627, slip. op. (Cook Co. Cir.
Ct. I1. Dec. 19, 1985), in which the Illinois circuit court for Cook County struck down
the major portions of a statute which limited malpractice awards, stating "[t]here is
no empirical data to support the claim that a medical malpractice insurance crisis
exists in the state of Illinois." Id. at 2. The court found that the cause of the crisis
was that insurance companies were raising their rates to recoup bad investments. Id.
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insurance industry's power to accomplish this arises not only
from the unique immunities that it enjoys from federal antitrust laws, 24 but also from the absence of any effective state
rate regulation.
The insurance industry denies this accusation, blaming the
crisis on liberal doctrines adopted by the courts. 2 5 These
doctrines include: discarding the locality rule, 2 6 adopting the
The court stated, "[a] sharp decline in the value of investments resulted in a reduction of 'reserves' for the payment of claims. The funding problems now asserted by
the insurers, are of their own making, not the outgrowth of 'unforseeable' [sic] increases in the number (frequency) and size (severity) of malpractice claims." Id. at 3.
See also Med-Mal Insurance "Crisis " is a Sham; State Statute Struck Down, 5 LAw ALERT 114
Jan. 27 (1986).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982).
25. See Londrigan, supra note 23, at 25. The insurance industry advised its insureds to demand immediate "crisis" legislation to reform the tort system. Id.
26. See Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 372-73 (Ky. 1970) ("that degree of care
and skill which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in the same class
to which he belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances"). The locality rule
requires that a physician's conduct be judged by the standard of care which is acceptable in that particular community. The rule is criticized as being unreconcilable with
the realities of modern medical practice, immunizing doctors from malpractice liability if they are the sole practitioner in their community, and preventing any possibility
of obtaining expert testimony due to the "conspiracy of silence" in the plaintiffs
locality. See Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 194, 349
A.2d 245, 249 (1975).
Some courts have wholly rejected the locality rule in favor of using a national
standard to guage a physician's acceptable standard of care. Courts adopting a national standard have both raised the standard of care, and have made it easier to
prove cases by expanding the pool of potential expert witnesses to include those who
are not doctors from that particular community. See, e.g., Blair, 461 S.W.2d at 372-73;
Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 79, 431 P.2d 973, 978 (1967) ("that degree
of care and skill which is expected of the average practitioner in the class to which he
belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances").
Other courts relax the strict locality rule and apply the "same or similar locality"
rule, enabling plaintiffs to obtain expert witnesses from other communities similar to
their own. See, e.g., Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 754, 205 P.2d 3, 5 (1949) (" 'same
locality' or 'vicinity' "); McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 1129, 43 N.W.2d 121,
126 (1950) ("under like circumstances and in like localities"); Karrigan v. Nazareth
Convent & Academy, Inc., 212 Kan. 44, 50, 510 P.2d 190, 195 (1973) ("in the community where he practices, or similar communities").
Finally, some courts have adopted a national standard which only applies to specialists. See, e.g., Kronke v. Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400, 403, 499 P.2d 156, 159 (1972)
("the standard of care required of physicians in the same specialty practiced by the
defendant"); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 109, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968)
("standard of care and skill of the average member of the profession practising the
speciality"); Christy v. Saliterman, 302 Minn. 144, 166 & n. 1, 179 N.W.2d 288, 302 &
n.1 (1970) (standard of care is "the nationally recognized professional standard");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF "ORTS,
§ 299A comment d (1976).
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discovery of the injury rule, 27 tolling minors' statutes of limitations pending the age of majority, 28 adopting the tort of emo30
tional distress, 29 allowing recovery for pain and suffering,
accepting the lack of an informed consent as an independent
32
tort,3 ' and adopting the doctrine of the loss of a chance.

Other commentators blame the medical malpractice crisis on
advances in technology that began in the 1960's and which
have dramatically changed the character of the physician-pa27. The majority of state courts have recently begun to interpret their statutes of
limitation, which are framed in terms of accrual, as not beginning to run until the
plaintiff discovers, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, his injury. See,
e.g., Jacoby v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 622 P.2d 613, 617 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981);
see also Dawson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 543 F. Supp. 1330, 1338-39 (D.D.C. 1982). Some
courts have gone even further and held that a cause of action does not accrue until
the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the negligence that caused the injury. See, e.g., Anderson v. Shook, 333 N.W.2d 708, 712 (N.D. 1982); Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979); Hoffman v. Rockey, 55 Or. App. 658, 639 P.2d 1284,
1286 (1982). Minnesota courts have stubbornly refused to follow this trend, holding
instead that the statute of limitations begins to run when the physician's medical
treatment for the particular condition ceases. SeeJohnson v. Winthrop Laboratories,
Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 291 Minn. 144, 149, 190 N.W.2d 77, 80 (1971).
28. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 541.15 (1984), which provides that the statute of limitations is suspended on a cause of action accruing for an injury to a minor until the
plaintiff reaches the age of majority. The plaintiff then has one year within which to
bring suit. Id. Statutes such as these are controversial because they are thought to
allow an unacceptable "long tail" of liability, making risk management an impossible
burden. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical MalpracticeInsurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 765 (1977).
29. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 336, 240
P.2d 282, 285 (1952); Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 1312, 242
N.W. 25, 28 (1932); Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (1977);
Campos v. Oldsmobile Div. General Motors Corp., 71 Mich. App. 23, 25, 246
N.W.2d 352, 353 (1976); Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Minn.
1983).
The majority of courts have accepted the intentional infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort, rather than as a "parasitic" cause of action pled only in
conjunction with another tort. See Harris, 281 Md. at 564 & n.1, 380 A.2d at 613 &
n.1.
30. California has led the move to limit award for pain and suffering. See Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 680-81, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 382-85 (upholding CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2), appeal dismissed, 106 S.Ct. 214 (1985).
31. See Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 699 (Minn. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 295 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn. 1980) (physician may be held liable for negligently failing to disclose risks of treatment to a patient subsequently harmed by those
risks who would not have undergone the treatment had he known of the risks).
32. This theory of recovery requires plaintiff to prove that he lost a chance, not a
guarantee, of recovery due to the defendants' negligence. See generallv King, Caiisation, Valuation and Chance in Personal inyi, Torts Iivolving PreexistingConditions aid Future
Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981); Wolfstone & Wolfstone, Recovery ofDamagesfor
the Loss of a Chance, 28 MED. T. TECH Q 121 (1981).
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tient relationship. 33 Doctors no longer treat all the needs of
their patients, but rather, focus only on one aspect of the patient's care, usually an area in which they specialize. The doctor's changing role causes a breakdown in the physicianpatient relationship which alters the character of the relationship from one of a family confidant, to that of an anonymous
technician. As a result, suing one's doctor has become much
less of a personal effront than it was in the past. This problem
is compounded by another byproduct of advanced technology-unreasonably high expectations of cure from medical
treatment. 34 Yet, another commentator explains the crisis as a
social phenomenon, claiming that the health care industry simply passed through phases in the 1960's and early 1970's which
3 5
reflect the climate of American politics.
6
Physicians have not escaped blame for causing the crisis.3
Malpractice is widespread, but there still is no effective discipli33. Robert W.Jamphis, M.D., President of the American Group Practices Association, stated three reasons for the crisis: (1) the breakdown of patient/doctor relationship; (2) the "Marcus Welby Syndrome"-expecting cures every time; and (3) the
publicity of large damage awards. PROGRAM ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES AND HEALTH POLICY CENTER OF GEORGETOWN

Washington, D.C. (May 8, 1975).
34. See id.
35. P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 380 (1982).
Professor Starr, an Associate Professor of Sociology at Harvard University, explains
that the first phase of this crisis grew out of a period of agitation and reform in the
first half of the 1970's. During that time, public pressure forced the law to provide
broader entitlements to social welfare and stricter regulation of industry. Id. The
general public's awareness of their civil rights, piqued by the demonstrations of the
late '60's and early '70's, caused people to believe that medical care was a right,
rather than a privilege, as was thought in the past. Id. at 389. Starr claims that
around 1975, public preoccupation with inflation caused them to doubt the value of
medical care. As a result, any movement toward a program of national health insurance was abandoned. Id. at 380.
This social climate caused physicians to experience the "end of a mandate" that
had, for decades, allowed them unregulated financial freedom and unquestioned
prestige and authority. See generally id. at 380-419. More people than ever before
were being treated by the health care system in the United States under social programs developed during this time frame. Id. at 384-85. This, in turn, increased the
number of potential victims of medical malpractice. These social factors, combined
with inflation, caused medical costs to skyrocket. Those paying higher costs for medical care expected more from the treatment they received. Id. at 381-82.
36. See Stein, Doctors 11ho Get Away with Killing and Maiming .Mlust be Stopped., N.Y.
Times, Feb. 2, 1986, at 23, cols. 2-5. Stein states: "American doctors are killing and
maiming thousands of patients every year-and, for the most part, they are getting
away with it. It is time that we in government, and the medical profession, came up
with some remedies for this national tragedy." Id. at col. 2.
UNIVERSITY,
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nary process to prevent incompetent physicians from practicing. 3 7 It is estimated that at any given time, up to fifteen
percent of the nation's physicians are incompetent and unfit to
practice medicine, yet these physicians continue to practice
and to harm their patients.3 8 Despite these statistics, state
medical licensing boards revoked only 255 licenses in 1984,
one for every 1,701 practicing physicians.3 ° The lack of a uniform approach to this problem among the states, their use of
disjointed disciplinary systems, and the medical profession's
own reluctance to demand or to enforce the disciplining of
their brethren, has helped to create and perpetuate the
40
problem .
Of course, lawyers are also blamed for the state of the medical malpractice climate. Plaintiffs' lawyers have been characterized as greedy, and exploitative, and wholly unethical in
pursuing large damage awards. 4 ' Some commentators claim
that contingency fees cause plaintiffs' attorneys to have too
37. Physicians are regulated by hospitals, medical societies, state licensing
boards, and federal peer review organizations. Since there is no coordination of
these efforts, however, incompetent physicians are able to move freely from hospital
to hospital, or state to state as problems arise. See Brinkley, U.S. Industry and Physicians
Attack Medical,.1lalpractice,N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1985, at 10, col. 1. The Public Citizen
Health Research Group reports that of nearly 400,000 nonfederal patient care doctors in the United States in 1983, only 563 had their licenses revoked, suspended, or
were put on probation. THE NEED FOR DISCIPLINARY REFORM, supra note 9, at 1. This
is true even though the HEW Malpractice Commission estimates that in 1983
203,000 people were injured while hospitalized due to doctors' negligence. Id. at 4.
38. The New York Times reports that an Illinois doctor, who had already been
sued for malpractice at least 13 times, was ordered by a jury to pay a woman $9
million for rendering her a quadriplegic after performing plastic surgery on her nose.
Brinkley, supra note 37, at 1,col. 1.
39. Id. This is equal to .05 percent. "More than one-half of the disciplinary actions nationwide are reprimands or administrative actions that have little or no effect
on a physician's right to treat patients." Id. at 10, col. 1.
40. Incompetent physicians increase medical costs. Errors lead to readmissions,
longer hospital stays, expensive additional surgery and medications, as well as other
unforeseen treatment, including malpractice lawsuits. ld. at 10, col. 1; Brinkley, Medical Discipline Laws: Confusion Reigis. N.Y. Times, Sept. 3. 1985, at 1,col. 3.
41. AnthonyJ. De Vito, a prominent New York medical malpractice defense lawyer, described his opposition as "plaintiWs attorneys who, while tenaciously guarding
their lucrative turfs, react like a maruading [sic] school of piranhas, tearing gluttonously at the body which sustains them while, at the same time, pretending to pursue
a course of justice!" De Vito, Abise of Litigation: Plague of the .MedicalProfession, N.Y.
ST. BAR J., July 1984, at 23, 24. This attack did not go without response from the
plaintiff's bar. See, e.g., Magner, Medical .alpraclice: The .-oswers to Ilr. De 'ito, N.Y.
ST. BAR J., Nov. 1984, at 10.
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large a stake in the outcome of lawsuits. 4 2
II.

TORT REFORM LEGISLATION

The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away. With respect to
medical malpractice litigation, the courts giveth and the
43
state legislatures taketh away.
Legislative tort reforms evolving in the area of medical negligence focus on curtailing medical negligence claims by modifying access to the courts, shifting the costs and burdens of
litigation from the insurance and the medical industries to
plaintiffs and their attorneys, and modifying evidentiary and
procedural requirements. Nearly every state has enacted some
type of tort reform, with certain states passing comprehensive
packages of legislation. 44 This section identifies the various
types of statutes enacted to accomplish tort reform. The tort
reforms that are analyzed cause medical malpractice lawsuits to
be a more complicated and burdensome procedure for the
plaintiff, while implementing no procedure to regulate the insurance industry or to reduce the incidence of malpractice.
Moreover, many of these tort reforms have been invalidated by
5
courts as violative of both the federal and state constitutions. 4
A.

Modifying Access to the Courts
1.

Statute of Limitations

The most frequently utilized legislative tort reform is shortening statutes of limitation for medical malpractice causes of
action. 4 6 Forty-one states have enacted legislation establishing
a specific statute of limitations for medical liability cases. The
majority of these statutes provide that the period of limitations
begins to run and the cause of action accrues when the negligence occurs. 4 7 Recently, however, several courts have
42. See, e.g., F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 4, 5 (1964);
Comment, Are Contingent Fees Ethical II'here Client is Able to Pay a Retainer? 20 OIlO ST.
LJ. 329, 339 n.53 (1959).
43. B. WERTHMANN, MEDICAl. MALPRACTICE LAW: How MEDICINE IS CHANGING
THE LAW 127 (1984).
44. AMA REPORT 2, supra note 3, at 13.
45. See infra notes 93 to 151 and accompanying text.
46. The states which have not established a separate statute of limitations for
medical liability cases are Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, New Jersey. Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia.
47. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-482 (1975); Coi.o. REv. STAT. § 13-80-105 (Supp.
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adopted the "discovery rule," which provides that the period

begins to run from the time at which plaintiff discovered or
should have discovered the injury
able diligence. 4 8 A few state courts
by declaring that the statute does
plaintiff discovers the negligence

through the use of reasonhave gone one step further
not begin to run until the
that caused the injury. 4 9

These decisions lengthen the insurer's period of risk. To insure that interpretations of this type do not unreasonably extend the period of limitations, over half of these states have

incorporated provisions with a maximum time limitation in
50
which a claim may be brought.

The extended period of risk or "long tail" for insurers in
medical malpractice claims is especially evident in the limitation statutes for minors, which, in most states, traditionally did
not begin to run until the child reached the age of majority. In
an effort to limit the risk period, several states have reduced
the tolling period of the statute from when a child reaches the
51
age of majority, to an arbitrarily chosen younger age.
1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6856 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95-11 (West
Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 657-7.3 (1976 & Supp. 1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
83 § 22.1 (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1, subsec. 2 (West Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 516.105 (Vernon Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-208, 25-222 (1985);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-13 (1978); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 203, 214-a (McKinney
1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18 (Supp. 1985);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Page Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.110 (1983);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 15-2-14.1, 15-2-22.1 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26116 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4 (1984-85); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.16.350 (Supp. 1985-86); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 655.04 (West Supp. 1985).
48. See generally 1 D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
1307
(rev. ed. 1973).
49. See supra notes 27, 28 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-482 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-542 (1985);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-105 (Supp.
1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 1. 18, § 6856 (2) (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-31 (West Supp. 1985-86); MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (1984); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60D (West 1985); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (1985); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 516.105 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:4 (1983); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-5-13 (1978); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 203 (McKinney 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-17(b) (1985); Oto REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Page Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-1-14.1(a) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-14.1 to 15-2-22.1
(1985); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. art. 4590 § 10.01 (Vernon 1985); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-14-4 (1984-85); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.56 (West 1985); Wyo. STAT.
§ 1-3-107 (1985).
51. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-482 (1975) (minor under age four has until age
eight to file claim for medial negligence); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982)
(minor under age six has three years or until his eighth birthday to file claim); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6856 (1974 & Supp. 1984) (minor under age six has three years
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2.

Arbitration

Several states have experimented with arbitration in the
medical malpractice arena. 5 2 Arbitration is usually a voluntary
alternative to litigation. 5 3 Patients and health care providers
enter into an agreement providing for arbitration of any dispute arising from the health care transaction. This agreement
is a substitute for a jury trial, not a condition to one. The procedure attempts to assure a fast and efficient decision by an
expert fact finder without the publicity or potential for an astronomical jury verdict. It is usually subject to only limited judicial review by a court on appeal.
Arbitration has been an unsuccessful alternative to the traditional court system because the parties are precluded from
having "their day in court." 5 4 Patients are reluctant to give up
this right and, therefore, this procedure is rarely used. 5 5
or until his sixth birthday to file claim); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 4590: (Vernon 1976 &
Supp. 1986) (minor under age twelve has until fourteenth birthday to file claim).
52. Although medical malpractice claims may be arbitrated in at least 30 states
under their general arbitration statutes, the following states have enacted arbitration
legislation specifically for medical malpractice claims: ALA. CODE § 6-5-485 (1975);
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (1985); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982); GA.
CODE ANN.

§ 9-9-112 (1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, § 201 (1985); LA. REV. STAT.

ANN. §§ 9:4230-:4236 (West 1983); ME. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2701-2715 (repealed
by ch. 492, § 1 (1977)); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5040 (West Supp. 1985); N.D.
CENT. CODE 32-29.1

(repealed

by ch. 358, § 1, 1981); OHIO REV.

CODE ANN.

§§ 2711.21-2711.24 (Page 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.101 (Purdon 1985);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-1 to 21-25B-26 (1979 & Supp. 1985); VT. STAT.

ANN. tit. 12, § 7001-08 (1985); VA. CODE §§ 8.01-581.1 to 581.12 (1984).
Minnesota has an arbitration plan drafted by the Minnesota State Bar Association in 1975, entitled "An Experimental Arbitration Plan for Medical Liability
Claims." This is to be used in conjunction with MINN. STAT. § 572 (1984), the general arbitration statute. For a discussion of its use, see Orwoll, Mediral Malpractice
Arbitration, BENCH & BAR OF MINN. Aug. 1985, at 31.

53. Courts have not imposed mandatory arbitration schemes due to the potential
conflict with the constitutional right to a civil jury trial. See Redish, supra note 28, at
765.
54. Cf Obstetrics & Gynecologists Williams G. Wixted, M.D., Patrick M. Flanagan, M.D., William F. Robinson, M.D., Ltd. v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985)
(court found arbitration agreement unenforceable as contract of adhesion because
patient in weaker bargaining position than doctor).
55. 1I Minnesota, for instance, as of August, 1985, only 14 medical malpractice
cases have been filed since September of 1975. Orwoll, supra note 43, at 31. Michigan has had a similar experience with their Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act of
1975, which, as of 1983, has been utilized for only 2-3% of the medical malpractice
cases in that state. EVALUATION: STATE OF MICHIGAN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION PROGRAM, TECHNICAL REPORT, VOL. I, ANALYSIS OF CLOSED MEDICAL MAI.-
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Pre-trialScreening

Pretrial screening panels designed to screen out nonmeritorious claims prior to trial have been adopted by many states.
Pretrial screening generally requires a mandatory pretrial
hearing to be conducted before a panel composed of physicians and attorneys. 56 The panel's decision is not binding on
the parties, and therefore, does not preclude a plaintiff from
subsequently bringing a lawsuit. 5 7 Consequently, these panels
may not achieve the intended result of decreasing malpractice
claims. States are split as to whether the panel's decision
58
should be admissible in court.
Wisconsin, for example, has mandatory pretrial screening
PRACTICE CLAIMS 1976-1982, at 109 (1983); see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5040
(West Supp. 1985).

56. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 655.17-.18 (West 1980). Wisconsin's formal
panels are composed of two health care providers, one attorney, and two public
members appointed by the governor. See id. § 655.03. The panel determines negligence, causation, and awards compensation. Id. § 655.065. These findings, however, are not binding on the parties unless the parties have agreed in writing to be so
bound. Id. § 655.07. In Wisconsin, if either party commences a court action after the
hearing, findings of formal panels are admissible in court, while findings of an informal panel are not. Id. § 655.19.
57. In at least one state, the fact that the panel decision was not binding was
crucial to upholding the statute against constitutional attack based on the right to a
trial. See State ex. rel Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978)
(Wisconsin statute providing for panel hearings as exclusive means for prosecution
of medical malpractice claims not unconstitutional because it does not impair right to
jury trial).
58. Statutes providing that the panel's decision is admissible in court include:
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.567 (1985); CONN.

GEN. STAT. § 38-196 (West 1985); DEL.. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6811 (1984); FLA STAT.
ANN. § 768.40 (West 1985) (held unconstitutional in Aldana v. Holub, 381 So.2d 231
(Fla. 1980), and repealed by laws 1983, ch. 82-214 § 15); IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9.9
(1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(H) (West 1985); MD. CTS &JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West 1984);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2844 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.016 (1985) (expires by limitation June 30, 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.1 (repealed in 1981); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Page 1985); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 40-1301.308 (Purdon
1985) (held unconstitutional in Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190
(1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-19-1 to 10-19-10 (repealed in 1981 Laws ch. 187 § 2):
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29.26-111 (1985) (Sunset 6183); VA. CODE §§ 8.01-581.8 (1985):
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.19 (West 1980).
Statutes providing that the panel's decision is not admissible at a later trial are:
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2601-2602 (repealed 1985); HAWAII REX'. STAT. § 671-16
(1984); IDAHO CODE § 6-1001 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, § 201 (1985); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2807 (1985): Mo. REV. STAT. § 208.195 (1985); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-6-606 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 519A (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 415-24 (1984); N.Y. JuDIC. LAW § 148a(4) (McKinney 1986).
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panel hearings in all medical malpractice cases.5 9 Wisconsin's
experience, however, has proven that pretrial screening panels
do not reduce the number of claims brought or the amount
paid on claims. 60 Moreover, Wisconsin's system has not been
effective in maintaining low medical malpractice insurance
premiums .61
The Illinois Legislature recently enacted yet another pretrial
screening procedure. In Illinois, a plaintiff is required to file a
Certificate of Merit within 90 days of bringing an action for
medical negligence. 62 The Certificate of Merit consists of an
affidavit stating the facts of the case, and a written report by a
knowledgeable health care professional who has reviewed the
case and deems it meritorious. 63 Failure to comply results in
64
dismissal of the suit.
The pretrial screening panels have proven ineffective. Since
plaintiffs are not bound by the panel's decision, and they are
not precluded from using the court system despite having received an unfavorable panel decision. Therefore, pretrial
screening frequently increases the costs of, and further delays,
the final resolution of the dispute. On the other hand, the pretrial screening method, which requires a Certificate of Merit,
will not delay or increase the costs of litigation since a medical
expert is necessary to prove most claims.
59. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.001-27 (West 1980 & Supp. 1985), which also
incorporates a patient compensation fund to be used in conjunction with the panels.
60. State Medical Society of Wisconsin, Medical Liability in Wisconsin: Problems and
Recommendationsfor Change, UPDATE 2 (Feb. 1985). Wisconsin State Medical Society
rcports on statutes from 1980 to 1984 show that the number of claims paid increased
iz those years 142% (from 66 to 160) and the average payments increased 65%
kfrom $24,889 to $40,660). Minnesota has not had a pretrial screening mechanism,
yet it has had a better experience with insurance claims. From 1981 to 1984, the two
major Minnesota Medical malpractice insurers, St. Paul Fire & Marine, and Minnesota Medical Insurance Exchange (accounting for 85-90% of all medical malpractice
insurance written in Minnesota) had an increase in the number of claims paid from
128 to 200 (56.2%), and the average claim paid increased only 14%, to over $54,000.
Statement by David Corum, Minn. Dept. of Commerce to the Minn. Medical Ass'n
Commission on Medical Professional Liablity, July 24, 1985, at 5.
61. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
62. Act ofJune 25, 1985, ch. 110,
2-1018(3) 1985 11. Legis. serv. 8-10 (to be
codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
2-622(3)).
63. Id. (1) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
2-622(1)).
64. Id. (3)(g) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-622(3)(g)).
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Shifting Costs and Burdens of Litigation
1.

Awarding Costs

In order to deter frivolous claims and defenses, some states
have enacted legislation providing for the payment of reasonable attorney and expert witness fees against the unsuccessful
party in addition to the usual court costs. 65 This type of statute
varies the procedure from the usual civil trial in which the prevailing party may have court costs paid by the opposing party,
but must still incur the expense of his own expert witness and
attorney fees. The statutes vary from state to state; some are
mandatory, and others are at the court's discretion when a
party has shown bad faith or has brought a frivolous claim or
66
defense.
2.

Limiting Attorneys' Fees

The contingent fee arrangement has long been criticized as
creating a conflict of interest for attorneys. 6 7 Critics of the
contingent fee argue that it manifests in the attorney a personal interest in the outcome of the case. This personal interest creates incentive for an attorney to encourage the public to
litigate and seek excessive damages. 6 To counteract this perceived problem, several states have enacted statutes which
either authorize court approval of reasonable attorneys' fees or
set limits as to the maximum amount attorneys may collect.
Some states provide for a sliding fee scale, whereby the percentage of the contingent fee collected by the attorney de69
creases incrementally as the amount of the award increases.
Other states have enacted legislation which authorizes a
court to approve or disapprove the reasonableness of the
65. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1029.6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.56 (West Supp. 1985) (repealed); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231 § 60B (West
1985);NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2834 (1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:9 (1983)
(claims or denials without reasonable cause); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.509 (Purdon 1985) (frivolous appeals); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.5 (Supp. 1985) (limiting
attorney contingent fee to 1/3).
66. See supra note 65.
67. See F. MACKINNON, supra note 43, at 5.
68. See Comment, supra note 42, at 339 n.53.
69. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 6865 (1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:8 (1983); N.Y. JUD. LAw § 474-a (McKinney Supp. 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.604 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
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fees. 70 Another scheme restricts fees to a certain percentage of
the plaintiff's award. 7 ' Wisconsin, for example, restricts attorneys' fees by excluding all amounts reflecting previously paid
medical expenses and future medical expenses in excess of
$25,000 from the amount upon which the contingency fee is
72
based.
3.

Altering the Collateral Source Rule

The collateral source rule prevents the value of any benefits
received by the injured party from sources other than the
tortfeasor to offset the damage recovery. 73 This rule is attacked as causing a windfall to plaintiffs, who may receive a
double recovery of their claimed damages by receiving insurance benefits and a damage award for the same injury.7 4 Since
many insurers have a subrogation right against a judgment in a
plaintiff's favor, which includes reimbursement for costs paid
by the insurer, proponents of the rule argue that few plaintiffs
ever actually receive overcompensation. Moreover, proponents argue that the rule prevents a tortfeasor from capitalizing on the good fortune and foresight of the plaintiff who has
paid the premiums to insure his risk. 7 5 With the advent of the
medical malpractice crisis, however, the collateral source rule
has been criticized as contributing to inflated damage awards
and unnecessary overcompensation. 76
State legislatures have taken two approaches to limit the effect of the collateral source rule. Some statutes allow the trier
70. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-568 (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.56 (West
Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 671-2 (Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.138
(West Supp. 1985); MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-07 (1984); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-2834 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-120 (1980) (reasonableness may
be determined but fees may not exceed 33 1/3%); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.070
(Supp. 1986).
71. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-5-1 (West 1984) (15% of award); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 752.150 (1983). Note that the Federal Torts Claim Act limits attorneys' fees to
20% in the event of settlement and 25% in the event the suit is resolved by a judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1982).
72. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 655.013 (West 1980).
73. See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. at 939, 424 A.2d 825, 835-36 (1985). See
generally Moceri & Messina, The CollateralSource Rule in PersonalInjury Litigation, 7 GONZAGA L. REV. 310 (1972).
74. Carson, 120 N.H. at 939, 424 A.2d at 835-36.
75. Moceri & Messina, supra note 73, at 315.
76. See Note, California 's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection
Challenge, 52 So. CAL. L. REV. 829, 949 (1979).
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of fact to hear testimony regarding collateral source payments
and to decide whether to offset any of the damage award. 77 A
second type of statute actually abolishes the collateral source
rule by requiring that the damage award be offset by the
amount of collateral source payments without informing the
78
jury of collateral sources.
4.

Limiting Damages

Several states have enacted legislation restricting recovery of
particular types of damages. These measures are implemented
by either statutes placing caps on the amount of damages a
plaintiff may recover, 7 9 or by statutes which limit the liability of
physicians or other health care providers participating in state
patient compensation funds. 80 Damage caps typically affect
only the severely injured person, since damages awarded to
those with lesser injuries do not reach the ceiling amounts.
Thus, the most helpless party among those involved in medical
malpractice litigation is burdened with the cost of malpractice.
This is fundamentally unfair. Moreover, severely injured patients, such as paraplegics, quadraplegics, or brain damaged
patients will undoubtedly require financial help from public
77. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 3333.1 (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (Supp. 1984); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-2819 (1984); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 4010 (Consol. 1975) (repealed by
1984 N.Y. Laws, ch. 701 § 1); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-19-34 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 21-3-12 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.080 (Supp. 1986).
78. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.50 (West
1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.136 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 4010
(repealed by 1984 N.Y. Laws, ch. 701, § 1); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.27 (Page
1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.602 (Purdon Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-26-119 (1980).
79. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73,
§ 1065.302 (1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2.1(Burns Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.42 (West Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (1984); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 26.1-14-11 (Supp. 1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Page 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 (Supp. 1985); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. art. 4590i
§ 11.02(a) (Vernon 1985); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.15 (1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.27
(West Supp. 1985).
80. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.54 (West 1985) (repealed by 1984 FLA. LAWS ch. 232,
§ 4); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 671.31 (1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.300 (1985);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-4-1 (West Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 304.40-330 (repealed by 1984 Ky. ACTS ch. 300, § 20); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.44 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2829 (1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-25 (1985);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-15 (1985) (repealed by 1983 N.D. LAws ch. 332, § 26);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 655.28 (West Supp. 1985).
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assistance programs unless they are adequately compensated
since the amount necessary for their lifetime maintenance can
easily surpass statutory limits. In that case, the cost of malpractice shifts from the private sector of the insurance and
health care industries to the public sector.
5.

Creating a Patient Compensation Fund

Some states have established funds to pay the portion of a
judgment or settlement in excess of statutory ceilings. 81 In order to limit its liability through this fund, a health care provider must be insured up to the statutorily designated amount.
The funds are usually financed through annual surcharges assessed against health care providers, and held in trust to be
invested by the insurance commissioner.8 2 This reform attempts to ensure compensation for malpractice victims and to
spread the risk among health care providers.
6.

Mandating Periodic Payments

Plaintiffs have traditionally received their damage awards in
lump sum payments. Recently, however, such payments have
become the subject of tort reform because they are more burdensome to insurers than periodic payments. Damages may
include payments for anticipated future medical care, loss of
future earning capacity, and future pain and suffering. A lump
sum, which includes payment for future damages, may
overcompensate the plaintiff who recovers or dies sooner than
expected. In addition, an award that may be paid out over
time is financially favorable for insurance companies, since the
plaintiff's award may be used to generate income over the payment period. Consequently, a number of states have enacted
legislation which permits or requires medical liability judg3
ments to be paid in installments.8
81. See supra note 80.
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-486 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (1983); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-2619 (Supp. 1985); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp.
1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6864 (1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.51 (West Supp.

1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-16 repealed by S.L. 1983, ch. 332, § 26; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.015 (West 1980 & Supp.).
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C. Modifying Evidentiary and ProceduralRequirements
1.

Limiting Res Ipsa Loquitur

Res ipsa loquitur is a common law doctrine permitting a plaintiff to prove negligence by circumstantial evidence.8 4 The doctrine requires the plaintiff to prove that the injury occurred
while the instrumentality which caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the defendant, and that the cause of
injury was one that ordinarily would not have occurred in the
absence of negligence.8 5 Perceived as a boon to increasing
medical liability claims, the use of res ipsa loquitur has been limited or modified in some states.8 6 These changes are an attempt to limit the number of res ipsa loquitur claims by raising
the standard of proof in medical negligence cases above that
required in other tort cases.
2.

Modifying Expert Witness Standards

Expert witnesses play an important role in establishing liability in medical negligence cases. Due to the technical nature
of these suits, and the particular standard of care required in
certain circumstances, physicians are best judged by fellow
physicians. Attempting to curtail medical malpractice claims,
some states have enacted legislation which restricts the qualifications and use of expert witnesses. These statutes vary from
making expert testimony mandatory in order to prevail in a
medical negligence case,8 7 to modifying the necessary qualifications of the expert, such as requiring the expert to practice
within the state in which the claim is brought, to have practiced
a certain percentage of his profession in the defendant's speciality, or to have practiced within the past year. 88
84. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, §§ 37-40 (5th ed. 1984).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.550 (1985); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 411.30
(West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6853 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.45(4) (Supp. 1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-1113 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 41A.100(1) (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 21 (West Supp. 1985-86); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 9-19-33 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115 (1980); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. Art. 4590i § 7.01 (Vernon 1985).
87. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6853 (Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 6-1013
(1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.100 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (Supp.
1985).
88. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6854 (Stipp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.45 (West Supp. 1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.43 (Page 1981): TENN.
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By enacting such legislation, states are not reducing the incidence of malpractice or its cost to patients, the medical community, or the public. These statutes also do not reduce the
number of claims that can be brought. Rather, such measures
simply frustrate the plaintiff's attempt to find a qualified expert
who supports the position that his injuries resulted from medical negligence. The task of finding a doctor to testify against
another doctor has always been difficult. This type of legislation makes that task more formidable.
3.

Limiting the Standard of Care

In order to prevail in a medical negligence action, the plaintiff must establish that the health care provider departed from
accepted standards of medical practice. Each state has its own
standard with which the defendant must comply. Some states
have enacted legislation that limits or modifies the standard of
care required by health care providers within that state. 8 9
These statutes generally codify the "locality rule."
4.

Ad Damnum Clause

The ad damnum clause is the part of the plaintiff's complaint which sets forth the recovery sought. 9 0 Many states have
enacted legislation that either excludes or limits the monetary
§ 29-26-115 (1980); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.20 (1984); see also N.H. REV.
§ 507-c:3 (1983) (requiring trial court to qualify expert witness).
89. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-484 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.540 (1985);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-563 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2614 (Supp. 1985);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.45 (West Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 6-1012 (1979); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2794(A) (West Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2912a
(West Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2818 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.100
(1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.13 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1985);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.17 (repealed by 1983 N.D. SESS. LAws ch. 82 § 184); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 17 (West 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115 (1985); VA. CODE
§ 8.01-581.20 (1950); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1908 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
STAT. ANN.

§ 7.70.030-.060 (1985).
Some statutes provide standards for specific circumstances. For instance, the
Florida statute states that the discovery of a foreign object left in a plaintiffs body is
prima facie evidence of negligence. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.45(4). The statute also
provides that the failure of a health care provider to administer "supplemental diagnostic tests" is not actionable if the provider acted in "good faith and with due regard
for the prevailing professional standard of care." Id.

90. See Morris, The Ad Damnumn Clause in THE AD DAMNUM CLAUSE: THE PROBLEM
AND SOLUTION 2 (Defense Research Inst. 1965) (containing a history of the ad
damnum clause).
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amount claimed in an ad damnum clause. 9 1 This reform seeks
to reduce publicity surrounding medical malpractice suits.
This tort reform is based on the theory that requests for large
damage awards in the ad damnum clause contributes significantly to the medical malpractice crisis by inflaming emotion
and encouraging other members of the public to seek similar
92
large recoveries.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

Every major category of tort reform has been found unconstitutional by at least one state supreme court.9 3 Courts have
declared entire acts void, finding that the tort reform measures
are so interrelated that it is impossible for any part of the law
to stand if one provision is declared unconstitutional, despite
severability clauses in the acts. 94 Commentators have questioned whether courts, in invalidating these statutes on constitutional grounds, have strained the meaning of the relevant
95
constitutional provisions beyond all legitimate bounds.
91. ALA. CODE § 6-5-483 (1985); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.547 (1985); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-566 (1985); ARK STAT. ANN. § 34-2618 (1985); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-112 (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.042 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE. § 9-118 (1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 671-4 (1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-604 (SmithHurd); IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-6 (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 619.18 (West 1985); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-208 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 304.40-270 (held unconstitutional in
McCoy v. Western Baptist Hosp., 628 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. App. 1981); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 1299.42 (1985); ME. REX'. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2901 (1985); MD. CTS. &JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-02 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60C (West
1985); MINN. STAT. § 544.36 (Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2822 (1985); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:6 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-4 (1985); N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
LAW § 3017(C) (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-I, Rule B (1983); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-30 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-26-117 (1985); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. Art. 4590(E) § 5.01; (Vernon
1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.28.360 (1986);
WIs. STAT. § 655.009 (1985).
92. See Medical Malpractice Committee Report, WIS. BAR BULLETIN, June 1975, at 19,
where the committee recommends that Wisconsin abolish the ad damnurn clause to
"keep gamesmanship and emotionalism out of the litigation process." Id. The committee further stated that "it is inappropriate, and emotionally devastating to some
physicians to have the news media report that doctors are being sued for huge sums
of money." Id.
93. AMA REPORT 2, supra note 3, at 14.
94. See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 946, 424 A.2d 825, 839 (1980); Arneson
v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 137-38 (N.D. 1978).
95. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 28, at 763.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss3/2

22

1986]

Qual: A Survey of Medical Malpractice Tort Reform

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TORT REFORM

A.

Standard of Review

Equal protection 9 6 and special legislation 9 7 arguments are
the most common challenges to tort reform legislation. 8
Medical malpractice legislation has an unequal impact on one
class of tort claimants-victims of medical malpractice. Thus,
these statutes discriminate among classes of injured tort claimants. 9 9 Whether the legislation will be upheld often depends
upon which standard of review the court utilizes in analyzing
the legislation. 0 0
When analyzing suspect legislation under an equal protection challenge, courts use one of three standards of review-a
rational basis, an intermediate, or a strict scrutiny standard.'10
The strict scrutiny standard is applied if the court deems that a
fundamental right 0 2 or a suspect classification1 0 3 is at issue.
States differ as to whether the right to receive adequate medideny to any
96. The United States Constitution provides: "No state shall ...
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.

XIV, § 1.
97. Many state constitutions contain provisions which prohibit the enactment of
special laws to benefit a particular class. The Illinois Constitution provides: "The
General Assembly shall pass no special of local law when a general law is or can be
made applicable." ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
98. AMA REPORT 2, supra note 3, at 14. The North Dakota Supreme Court invalidated its entire medical malpractice act on primarily equal protection grounds. See
Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 136.
99. Redish, supra note 28, at 769. In Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio
Ct. Com. Pleas 1976) the court stated:
There is no satisfactory reason for this separate and unequal treatment.
There obviously is "no compelling governmental interest" unless it be argued that any segment of the public in financial distress be at least partly
relieved of financial accountability for its negligence. To articulate the requirement is to demonstrate its absurdity, for at one time or another every
type of profession or business undergoes difficult times, and it is not the
business of government to manipulate the law so as to provide succor to one
class, the medical, by depriving another, the malpracticed patients, of the
equal protection mandated by the constitution.
Id. at 320, 343 N.E.2d at 837.
100. See generally Harper, Which Equal Protection Standardfor Medical MalpracticeLegislation, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 125 (1980).
101. Id.
102. The United States Supreme Court has limited the fundamental rights category to rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
103. A classification is "suspect" when the "class is ... saddled with such disabilities or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of unequal powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio Independent School Dist., 411 U.S.
at 28.
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cal care is a fundamental right.' 0 4 If the court finds that a fundamental right is at stake, the state must show that the statute
0 5
is necessarily related to a compelling governmental interest.
If no fundamental right is involved, the rational basis standard
is applied and, a statute is valid if it is rationally related to a
06
legitimate state objective.
A third, intermediate, standard has been applied to invalidate medical malpractice legislation challenged on an equal
protection basis.' 0 7 This test applies to "suspect classifications," or "near fundamental" rights. Although the Supreme
Court has limited the application of the intermediate standard
test to cases involving classifications based on gender and illegitimacy, 108 some state courts have expanded the classifications to which this standard applies to include the right to
recover for personal injuries. 10 9 Using this standard, a court
determines whether the classification substantially furthers the
asserted purpose for the classification.' 10 In contrast to the rational basis standard, the intermediate standard requires a
state to provide a greater justification for its classification.'' It
entails a close scrutiny of the legislative means and ends, with
104. Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court stated that the right to receive adequate
medical care is a fundamental right. Prendergast, 199 Neb. 97, 114, 256 N.W.2d 657,
668 (1977). But cf. Carson, 120 N.H. at 931, 424 A.2d at 830 ("right to recover for
one's injuries is not a fundamental right"); accord Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97
Idaho 859, 870, 555 P.2d 399, 410 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
105. See, e.g., Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 49 (Colo. 1984) (three year statute of
repose in medical malpractice claim violated state equal protection guarantee). See
Wilson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional
Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975).
106. For states applying a rational basis test, see State ex rel Schneider v. Liggett,
223 Kan. 610, 618, 576 P.2d 221, 227-28 (1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 808
(1978); Prendergast, 199 Neb. at 113, 256 N.W.2d at 667; State ex rel Strykowski v.
Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 508, 261 N.W.2d 434, 442 (1978).
107. See, e.g., Jones, 97 Idaho at 866, 555 P.2d at 411; Johnson v. Saint Vincent
Hosp. Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 397, 404 N.E.2d 585, 600 (1980) (fair and substantial relationship between classification and purpose of legislation); Carson, 120 N.H. at 933,
424 A.2d at 831 ("whether challenged classifications are reasonable and have a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation"); Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 133
("close correspondence between statutory classification and legislative goals"). This
intermediate standard has been called a "means scrutiny" test. Woods v. Holy Cross
Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1172 (5th Cir. 1979)
108. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1979) (illegitimacy); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (gender).
109. Carson, 120 N.H. at 931-32, 424 A.2d at 830-31.
110. See Jones, 97 Idaho at 865-67, 555 P.2d at 413-16.
111. See id.
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less deference accorded to legislative judgments.'12 Instead of
determining the merits of the asserted legislative goal of ameliorating the medical malpractice crisis, the court asks whether
a crisis, does in fact exist, and then, whether the challenged
legislation substantially furthers the goal of alleviating that crisis.l13 Continued use of this standard to determine the validity
of malpractice legislation may result in a proliferation of "sus1 14
pect classifications" or an expansion of fundamental rights.
Courts have also applied special legislation arguments in
testing the validity of tort reform.' 15 Many state constitutions
provide that a special law benefitting a class of persons may
not be passed when a general law is, or can be, applicable." 16
B.

Modifying Access to the Courts

Critics of pretrial screening panels argue that the panels violate the due process" 7 and equal protection" 8 clauses of the
Constitution, as well as unconstitutionally providing for the
performance of judicial functions by nonjudicial entities."l 9
These panels have also been found to deny a claimant's fundamental right of access to the courts. 20 The most critical factor
in upholding the constitutionality of a pretrial screening panel
is whether the review is mandatory or voluntary. 12 ' If
mandatory, it may be struck down as violating the right of ac112. See id.
113. See Redish, supra note 28, at 773.
114. See Harper, supra note 99, at 137.
115. See Redish, supra note 28, at 773.
116. See supra note 97.
117. See Lacy v. Green, 428 A.2d 1171, 1176-77 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981) (holding
that revealing panel's findings to jury is not violative of due process).
118. See Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 424 N.E.2d 586 (1981)
(holding statute did not violate equal protection); accord Lacy, 428 A.2d at 1178.
119. See Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736,
739 (Ill. 1976). For courts holding these panels constitutional, see Johnson, 404
N.E.2d 585 ; Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.2d 1256 (La. 1978); Attorney General v.
Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978); Paro v.
Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d
1187 (Mont. 1981).
120. See Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hasp., 583 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 1979). But see
Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976), aff'd. 43 N.Y.2d 696,
401 N.Y.S.2d 200, 372 N.E.2d 34 (1977), in which the court held that the statute
providing for a medical malpractice panel did not deny the fundamental right of access to the courts. The screening panel, however, was convened after the court proceedings were commenced.
121. See AMA REPORT 2, supra note 3, at 16.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1986

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 2
ILLIAM'I MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

cess to courts, 12 2 the right to ajury trial, 23 or the separation of
powers doctrine.' 2 4 Arguably, if the panel determines liability,
or if its decision is seen as a form of expert evidence relied
upon at a later trial, this is an improper ursurpation of judicial
power.' 25 This argument lacks substance, however, due to the
non-binding nature of the panel's findings. 12 6 If the panel is
voluntary, it will escape these challenges. In complying with
these constitutional requirements, however, a panel is unlikely
to achieve the goals of efficiency and screening out nonmerito27
rious claims. 1
Permitting the panel's decision to be admitted into evidence
at a subsequent trial is challenged as diluting the right to a jury
trial.' 2 8 Although the panel's decision is not binding at the
later trial, its decision may unduly influence a jury, and thus
preclude the plaintiff's right to receive a meaningful jury
trial.' 29 Courts have rejected this argument, finding that the
panel merely provides the jury with the opinion of an expert
panel, which the plaintiff may rebut at trial. 30 This controversy does not arise in jurisdictions in which the panel's findings are not admitted into evidence at a later trial.' 3'
Administration of pretrial screening or arbitration panels
may also lead to constitutional challenges. 3 2 The pre-litigation burden requiring a plaintiff to undergo the cost and delay
of a pretrial process as a condition to trial may effectively de33
prive a plaintiff of state guaranteed access to the courts.
122. CardinalGleninon lemorial Hosp., 583 S.W.2d at 109-10.
123. See Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 391, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (1980).
124. See Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 739-40.
125. But see Redish, supra note 28, at 795 (stating that this is a strained concept of
separation of powers).
126. Id.
127. AMA REPORT 2, supra note 3, at 16.
128. See Comiskey v. Arlen, 390 N.Y.S. 2d 122, 127-28 (1976); Simon v. Saint
Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 N.E.2d 903, 907-08 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1976).
129. Redish, supra note 28, at 792.
130. See Comiskey, 390 N.Y.S. 2d at 125-26; see also Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz.
576, 580-81, 570 P.2d 744, 748-49 (1977) (admissibility of panel findings is merely
rule of evidence, not violation of right to jury trial); Prendegast, 199 Neb. at 110, 256
N.W.2d at 665-66 (mere rule of evidence does not usurp judicial function).
131. See Redish, supra note 28, at 793; Comment, supra note 8, at 1461 & n.222.
132. AMA REPORT 2, supra note 3, at 16.
133. See Aldona, 381 So. 2d 231, 236-38 (medical malpractice statute ten month
jurisdictional period unconstitutional as applied); Simon, 355 N.E.2d at 907-08 (statute providing for compulsory arbitration before medical malpractice screening panel
found unconstitutional). But see Johnson, 282 Md. at 299, 385 A.2d at 71 (additional
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The Florida Supreme Court invalidated its pretrial procedures,
finding them to be arbitrary and capricious and violative of a
plaintiff's due process rights. In support of this conclusion,
the court stated that the procedure had "proven unworkable
3 4
and inequitable in practical operation."'
Courts have struck down special statutes of limitation for minors on the grounds that such limitations violate equal protection 3 5 or arbitrarily deny minors their right to seek redress for
injuries. 13 6 Measures to shorten the statutes of limitation for
all medical malpractice victims have been unsuccessfully attacked as special legislation or as violating the equal protection
37
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 1
Limitation statutes have also been altered so that the discovery rule applies only to situations where a foreign object is discovered in a plaintiff's body." 8 This type of statute has been
successfully challenged as discriminating between different
members of the class of medical malpractice claimants. 1 39 Curtailing or limiting the discovery rule in medical malpractice
cases may violate state constitutional right of access provisions
40
as well. '
cost and delay of mandatory pretrial arbitration does not violate due process); 11lattos,
491 Pa. at 390-91, 421 A.2d at 196 (arbitration procedure is not impermissible burden on constitutional right to jury trial).
134. Aldona, 381 So. 2d at 237.
135. See Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 6 Ohio St. 3d 300, 452 N.E.2d
1337, 1338 (1983).
136. Carson, 120 N.H. at 936, 424 A.2d at 833.
137. See, e.g., Barrio v. San Manuel Div. Hosp., 143 Ariz. 111, 692 P.2d 290 (Ariz.
App. 1983) (statute of limitation does not violate equal protection); Mishek v. Stanton, 616 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1980) (statute of limitation does not violate equal protection or constitute special legislation); Duffy v. King Chiropractic Clinic, 17 Wash.
App. 693, 595 P.2d 435 (1977) (statute of limitation is not violative of equal protection provisions of state or federal constitutions). But see Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41,
48 (Colo. 1984) (statute of limitation violates equal protection to the extent that it
denies application of the discovery rule to negligently misdiagnosed medical malpractice plaintiffs).
138. See Carson, 120 N.H. at 935, 424 A.2d at 833.
139. See id.; but see Allrid v. Emory Univ., 249 Ga. 35, 285 S.E.2d 521, 524-25
(1982) (upholding classification which granted foreign object victims an exception to
the Georgia statute of limitation on the theory that the classification eliminated the
danger of belated, false or frivolous claims), aff'd, 251 Ga. 367, 306 S.E.2d 905
(1983).
140. Redish, supra note 28, at 791.
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Shifting the Costs and Burdens of Litigation

State statutes abolishing the collateral source rule only in
medical malpractice cases have been successfully challenged
on equal protection grounds for discriminating against medical malpractice claimants.14' Other courts, however, have held
that this legislation is constitutional, finding that it bears a reasonable relationship to the legitimate state interest of ensuring
142
the availability of adequate medical care.
Fixed caps on the amount of damages that victims can recover have been vulnerable to constitutional challenges.
Courts have found these limitations void for arbitrarily limiting
the rights of injured plaintiffs to recover. 143 Other courts have
found that the limitations deny patients equal protection by
precluding the most seriously injured victims from fully recovering for their injuries.14 4 Still, other courts have rejected limitations on recovery, stating that the asserted general societal
quidpro quo provided by the limitation, in the form of reduced
insurance premiums and lower medical costs, did not extend
to the seriously injured malpractice victim.' 4 5 Similarly, courts
have found that allowing a court to order periodic payments to
eliminate the "bonus element of a judgment," such as when a
judgment includes future damages and a patient dies premaprovturely, unreasonably discriminates in favor of health care
146
iders, and unduly burdens seriously injured plaintiffs.
Statutes limiting contingent fee agreements have also been
141. Carson, 120 N.H. at 940-41, 424 A.2d at 836-37; see also Doran v. Priddy, 534
F. Supp. 30 (D. Kan. 1981) (permitting evidence of collateral source at trial only in
medical malpractice cases invalid); Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio Ct.
Com. P1. 1976) (court found statute requiring collateral benefits received by claimant
be listed only in complaints for medical malpractice violated equal protection).
142. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 583, 570 P.2d 744, 751-52 (1977); Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp., 403 So.2d 365, 367-68 (Fla. 1981); Rudolph
v. Iowa Methodist Medical Ctr., 293 N.W.2d 550, 558-60 (Iowa 1980).
143. See, e.g., Wright, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 330, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742-43.
144. Carson, 120 N.H. at 943, 424 A.2d at 838; Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 136; Simon,
355 N.E.2d at 906; Duren v. Suburban Community Hosp., 482 N.E.2d 1358, 1362-63
(Ohio Ct. Corn Pi. 1985). But see Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 211 Cal Rptr.
308, 695 P.2d 665, 680-82 (1985) (non-economic damage limitation of $250,000 upheld); Prendergast, 199 Neb. at 115, 256 N.W.2d at 669 (claimant elects cap in return
for guaranteed payment).
145. See lright, 63 Ill.2d at 328, 347 N.E.2d at 742. But see Prendergast, 199 Neb. at
120-21, 256 N.W.2d at 671 ("there is no merit to the argument that if a common law
right is taken away, something must be given in return").
146. See Carson, 120 N.H. at 944, 424 A.2d at 838.
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challenged.' 47 Arguably, this type of reform aggravates the
problem by acting as an incentive for attorneys to advise their
clients to seek higher verdicts and settlements in order to maximize their own fees.' 14 The New Hampshire Supreme Court
has held that this reform violates equal protection by discrimi49
nating between one class of plaintiffs and their attorneys.
The court also stated that sliding scale attorneys' fees interfere
with the freedom to contract between an attorney and his client, and unfairly make medical malpractice cases unattractive
to attorneys. 50 Contingent fee limitations create a potential
impediment to injured plaintiff's access to the courts, since a
plaintiff's ability to sue is often dependent upon the contin5
gency fee system.' '
IV.

MINNESOTA'S RESPONSE

Prior to 1986, the Minnesota Legislature had been relatively
dormant with respect to crisis medical malpractice tort reform.
During the 1986 legislative special session, however, strong
tort reform measures were enacted, 15 2 which affect all civil actions, as well as some measures directed specifically at medical
53
negligence actions.
147. See id. at 944-45, 424 A.2d at 838-39.
148. AMA REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.
149. Carson, 120 N.H. at 945, 424 A.2d at 838-39.
150. Id. ContraJohnson, 273 Ind. at 401-02, 404 N.E.2d at 602-03; Roa v. Lodi
Medical Group, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d 920, 925-34, 211 Cal Rptr. 77, 79-85, 695 P.2d 164,
164-72 (1985) (limit on attorneys' fees does not violate equal protection, due process, or separation of powers doctrine).
151. Cf Carson, 120 N.H. at 945, 424 A.2d at 839.
152. Act of March 25, 1986, ch. 455, §§ 60, 79-84, 86-89, S.F. No. 2078 (to be
codified in scattered sections of the Minnesota Statutes.) [hereinafter cited as S.F.
No. 2078].
Neither the Minnesota Session Law Service, nor the Laws of Minnesota for 1986
were published at the writing of this Article. Consequently, the citations to the new
legislation will refer to the House file number (S.F. No. 2078) as indicated above.
153. The Minnesota Medical Association initiated a Commission in Professional
Liability in 1985. From the Commissioner's report, several proposed bills were
drafted. The most substantial by Kathleen Blatz, (Rep. I.R. Bloomington) which
would have implemented, among other things, a mandatory pretrial certification of
expert review, a five-year limit on the tolling of the statute of limitations for minors,
elimination of punitive damages, a $250,000 limit on non-economic damages, abolition of the collateral source rule, and a provision for periodic payments of damages
exceeding $100,000. See MINNESOTA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE MINNESOTA COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY (Nov. 1985) (copy on file at the William Mitchell Law Review office).
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Modifying Access to the Courts
1.

Statute of Limitation

Until just recently, Minnesota's medical malpractice statute
of limitation had remained essentially unchanged since its
adoption in 1945. This statute provides that an action based on
negligence by physicians or hospitals must be brought within
two years of the negligent act.' 54 Prior to 1986, the most significant change in the limitations statute was in its breadth.
The statute was expanded to include not only physicians, surgeons and dentists, but also "all other health care professionals." ' 55 With respect to the limitation statutes, the 1986
legislation affects only plaintiffs under the age of 18 who are
victims of medical negligence. 156 The new statute applies to all
medical malpractice actions commenced on or afterJanuary 1,
1987, and provides that the period of limitations may not be
suspended for more than seven years or for no more than one
15 7
year after the age of minority ceases.
2.

Arbitration

There is no specific arbitration statute for medical malpractice cases in Minnesota, however, an arbitration plan was developed by a subcommittee of the Minnesota State Bar
Association in 1971.158 This procedure utilizes the general
154. Minnesota Statutes section 541.07 provides:
Except where the uniform commercial code or this section otherwise
prescribes, the following actions shall be commenced within two years:
(1) for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other tort,
resulting in personal injury, and all actions against physicians, surgeons,
dentists, other health care professionals as defined in section 145.61, and
veterinarians as defined in chapter 156, hospitals, sanitoriums, for malpractice, error, mistake, or failure to cure, whether based on contract or tort.
MINN. STAT. § 541.07 (1984).
155. 1984 MINN. LAws ch. 608 § 4. This change shortened the time in which a
plaintiff was required to file suit against nurses, dental hygienists, and other health
care professionals who previously could have been found to fall under the six-year
statute of limitations.
156. S.F. No. 2078, supra note 152, § 79 (to be codified as amended at MINN. STAT.
§ 541.15(a)(1) (1986)).
157. Id. § 79 (to be codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 541.15(b) (1986)). This
provision has been interpreted by those who drafted it to provide that the two-year
statute of limitations does not begin to run until seven years after the cause of action
arises. Therefore, the child has nine years within which to bring a claim, unless he
reaches the age of 18 first, and then the child must bring the claim by his 19th birthday. Under no circumstances may the period of limitation be less than two years.
158. See Orwoll, Medical MalpracticeArbitration, BENCH & B. MINN., Aug. 1985, at
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Minnesota Arbitration Statute, 5 9 and specifically provides for
a voluntary agreement between patients and health care providers to arbitrate their claims.' 60 The procedure has been so
seldomly used, 16' however, that it is difficult to evaluate its effect on medical malpractice litigation other than to surmise
that, as a result of its infrequent implementation by practition62
ers, it has had no effect whatsoever.
3.

Certificate of Review

The 1986 reform measures include a statute which requires
that a certification of expert review accompany the service of
summons and complaint in all medical malpractice cases commencing on or after August 1, 1986.163 The certifying affidavit
must be signed by the plaintiff's attorney and state that the
case has been reviewed by "an expert whose qualifications provide a reasonable expectation that the expert's opinions could
31. The plan was drafted by the Minnesota State Bar Associaton (M.S.B.A.) LegalMedical Committee, and was supported by the Board of Governors, the Minnesota
Medical Association (M.M.A.), and the Minnesota Hospital Association (M.H.A.). Id.
The medical and bar associations selected 140 lawyers and 90 doctors as potential
arbiters. Id. The plan calls for a prehearing conference to be held and formal
dicovery is permitted, as in a court trial. Id. at 32. The applicable hearing procedure,
however, is that of a general arbitration hearing. Id. The arbiters issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the decision is appealable. Id.
159. MINN. STAT. § 72.08-40 (1984).
160. Orwoll, supra note 151, at 31.
161. Id. This plan was originally received with great support by the medical and
legal community in June of 1975. However, as of August 1985, the experimental
plan had only processed 14 cases. Id.
162. Michigan has had a similar experience with their Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act, enacted in 1975. MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5040-.5065 (Supp.
1985); see Mengel, The Constitutionaland ContractualChallenges to "lichigan"s Medical .lalpractice ArbtitrationAct, 59 J. OF URBAN L. 319 (1982). The Michigan Act is quite similar to the Minnesota plan. It is a wholly voluntary contractual arrangement between
physician and patient which may only be entered into prior to treatment. See Mengel,
at 321. The Michigan Act, like Minnesota's plan, is informal, involving a panel of
medical and legal members. Id. Similarly, the Michigan Act has had very little, if any,
effect on medical malpractice litigation in that state. APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH, INC.,
EVALUATION: STATE OF MICHIGAN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION PROGRAM,
TECHNICAL REPORT, VOL. 1, ANALYSIS OF CLOSED MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS

1976-1982 (Oct. 1983). Only 2-3% of all medical malpractice cases in Michigan have
utilized the Act to resolve their claims. Id. at 109, 111.
163. S.F. No. 2078, supra note 152, § 60 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.682
(1986)). If the suit must be commenced before expert review can be obtained in
order to preserve plaintiffs claim, the plaintiff must serve an affidavit along with the
summons and complaint specifying this and then serve defendant or defense counsel
with the certifying affidavit within 90 days after service of the summons and
complaint.
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be admissible at trial."164 The expert must be of the opinion
that one or more of the defendants has deviated from the applicable standard of care, thereby causing the plaintiff's
injury. 165
In addition to the certyifying affidavit, a plaintiff must provide the defendant with an affidavit identifying the expert witnesses upon whose testimony the plaintiff will rely at trial
within 180 days after commencement of the suit. 1 66 The affidavit must include the identity of each expert, the substance of
the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. These
new requirements must be met only in cases and to issues in
which expert testimony is necessary to prove a prima facie case
of medical negligence. 6 7 The statute also provides that the
parties can agree to extensions of the time limits or that the
court may extend these time limits upon a showing of good
cause.' 6 8 The penalty for noncompliance with these requirements is harsh-upon motion, those issues in the case requiring expert testimony will be dismissed with prejudice. 69
Although the implementation of this statute will likely expedite the pretrial discovery process and reduce the frequency of
frivolous claims, it may also cause the dismissal of meritorious
164. Id. § 60 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subd. 3(a) (1986)) See
Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.A.2d 684, 699 (Minn. 1977), rev'd on other grounds. 295
N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn. 1980) for a description of an expert who is qualified to
testify.
165. S.F. No. 2078, supra note 152, § 60 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.682,
subd. 3(a) (1986).
166. Id. § 60 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subd. 4 (1986)). Plaintiff
must disclose the expert's name, substance of facts and opinions to which the expert
is expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. This may be
provided in an affidavit executed by plaintiff or his attorney, or by answer to expert
interrogatories. Id. Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure require that answers to expert's interrogatories be based upon the same criteria prior to trial, therefore, this
portion of the new law changes only the time frame within which this requirement
must be completed.
167. Id. § 60 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subd. 2 (1986)). Evidently,
excluding the rare res ipsa loquitor cases where lay persons are able to grasp the issues
and determine negligence without the help of an expert.
168. Id. § 60 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subd. 4 (1986)).
169. Id. § 60 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subd. 6 (1986)). Upon
motion, the action will be dismissed with prejudice if plaintiff's attorney fails to comply within 60 days of defendant's demand for the certiling affidavit. Failure to comply with the expert identification requirement results in mandatory dismissal with
prejudice upon motion of the defendant. Note that pro se plaintiffs must also comply
with this provision.
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claims, since plaintiffs may be unable to comply with the arbitrary time frame. Thus, the already difficult task of locating a
qualified physician willing to testify against the defendant physician will be further complicated by a short time frame.
B.

Shifting the Costs and Burdens of Litigation

Shifting the costs and burdens of litigation has been the
most popular response to rising insurance costs in other states.
Until the recent legislation, Minnesota had not invoked any of
the mechanisms used to achieve the goal of this type of tort
reform. All civil actions commenced on or after August 1,
1986, however, will be subject to collateral source calculations, 7 0 a $400,000 limit on intangible losses,' 7 ' a requirement that juries allocate damages as past, future, and
intangible, 17 2 and a discounting of future damages to present
value.'

73

1.

Collateral Source Rule

The new collateral source rule provides that in any civil action where liability is admitted or determined, a party may file
a motion for determination of collateral sources within ten
days of the verdict if damages include an award for losses com74
pensible by collateral sources up to the'date of the verdict.'
Once the motion is filed, the parties must submit written evidence of the amount of collateral sources paid to benefit the
plaintiff, except those for which subrogation rights have been
asserted.' 7 5 Amounts incurred by or on behalf of the plaintiff
or his immediate family to secure the right to payment from a
collateral source for the two years prior to accrual of the cause
of action shall also be submitted as evidence.1 76 The court
shall then offset these two values and reduce the verdict accordingly. 1 77 The jury will not be informed of the plaintiff's
78
collateral sources.'
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 80
§ 88
§ 89
§ 86
§ 80
§ 80
§ 80
§ 80
§ 80

(to
(to
(to
(to

be
be
be
be

codified
codified
codified
codified

at
at
at
at

MINN.
MINN.
MINN.
MINN.
(to be codified at MINN.
(to be codified at MINN.
(to be codified at MINN.
(to be codified at MINN.
(to be codified at MINN.
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Limiting Damages

The new tort reform legislation provides that in all civil
suits, "intangible damages" shall not exceed $400,000.179 Intangible damages are defined as embarrassment, emotional
distress, and loss of consortium, and do not include pain, disability, or disfigurement.1 8° Again, the jury is not informed of
this limitation. 18 ' A plaintiff's verdict is further discounted in
all civil cases claiming personal injury, wrongful death, or loss
of means of support by reducing future damages to their present day value. 18 2 Evidence of projected future earnings and
loss of future earning capacity cannot be based on inflationary
changes or general economic statistics and must be reasonably
certain to occur.' 8 3 Those statutory changes affecting the actual amount paid in a verdict will be facilitated by a new provision requiring the jury to break down its assessment of
damages into past and future damages and to further specify
the amount of intangible losses within those two categories. 8 4
3.

Contingent Attorneys' Fees

The traditional contingent attorneys' fee arrangement is also
changed by the 1986 reform. Pursuant to the new legislation,
contingent attorneys' fees will be based on the award as adjusted to comply with the new collateral source rule.' 8 5 Any
subrogated provider of collateral sources must pay the same
percentage of attorneys' fees as paid by the plaintiff and its
proportionate share of the costs ifit is not separately represented by counsel in its action to recover collateral
86
payments. 1
179. Id. § 88 (to be codified at MINN. STA'r. § 548.23, subd. 2 (1986)). Note also
that subdivision 4 of section 548.23 makes it clear that "this section does not create a
new cause of action for intangible loss." Id.
180. Id. § 88 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 548.23, subd. 1 (1986)).
181. Id. § 88 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 548.23, subd. 3 (1986)).
182. Id. § 86 (to be codified at MINN .STAT. § 604.07, subd. 2 (1986)).
183. Id. § 86 (to be codified at MINN. SrAT. § 604.07, subd. 3 (1986)).
184. Id. § 89 (to be codified at MINN. STrAT. § 549.24 (1986)).
185. Id. § 80 (to be codified at MINN. STrAT. § 548.36. subd. 4 (1986)).
186. Id. This section appears to encourage plaintiff's counsel to represent the
subrogated collateral source provider as well as the plaintiff in order to maintain
attorneys' fees equivalent to the pre-adjustment award.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss3/2

34

Qual: A Survey of Medical Malpractice Tort Reform
.1EDICAL

1986]

C.

I.LIIJ.PIICTICE 7"0I? TREFORM

Modifying Evidentiary and ProceduralRequirements
1.

Punitive Damages

Pretrial procedures have been altered by the 1986 legislation.
First, punitive damages may not be claimed in the summons
and complaint in any civil action. 8 7 The legal basis for punitive damages must be alleged in a motion to amend the complaint. 18 8 The motion must be supported by one or more
affidavits stating the factual basis for the claim. 18 9 The movant
has the burden of proving with prima facie evidence of the allegations before the court may grant the motion. 90
2.

Access to Treating Physician's Opinions

The second pretrial alteration affects only medical malpractice claims. Formerly, a plaintiff bringing a claim for medical
malpractice was deemed to have waived his physician-patient
privilege. Defendants were thus able to gain access to a plaintiff's medical records and obtain deposition testimony relating
to a plaintiff's medical condition. Pursuant to the new legislation, claims commenced or pending on August 1, 1986, will
also allow defendants access to a plaintiff's treating physician
by permitting informal interviews if the treating physician consents. 19 ' The defendant is required to give prior notification
to plaintiff's counsel of the informal conference so that he may
attend. 192
3.

Ad Damnum Clause

In 1978, the Minnesota Legislature required that ad damnum
clauses in actions for damages of unliquidated amounts state
only that they are deemed to be over $50,000, unless the
amount requested was less than $50,000.193 As in other jurisdictions, the asserted purpose of this legislation was to reduce
187. Id. § 82 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 549.191 (1986)).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. The statute also provides: "For purposes of tolling the statute of limitations, pleadings amended under this section relate back to the time the action was
commenced." Id.
191. Id. § 84 (to be codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 4 (1986)).
If the treating physician does not consent to an informal meeting, his deposition may
be taken by defendant without a court order. Id.
192. Id.
193. Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 738, 1978 Minn. Laws 838.
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publicity generated by large damage claims.1 94
D.

Insurance Regulation

The 1986 legislature passed several insurance reporting and
regulating provisions.19 5 One provision requires liability insurers such as those providing medical malpractice coverage, to
provide the Commissioner of Insurance with annual reports,
including direct writings in Minnesota and the United States,
direct premiums written, net investment income, incurred
claims, reserves, actual increased expenses and net operation,
and underwriting gains or losses. This measure increases the
accountability of the professional liability insurer. Prior legislation already required Minnesota professional liability insurers to report, on a quarterly basis, any medical malpractice
awards or settlements made on behalf of their insureds. t 96 In
addition, such insurers are required to report and maintain
records of the subject doctors. 19 7 The pre-1986 legislation
also provided for Attorney General investigations of those
doctors as necessary. 98 Neither the newly enacted reporting
measures or the previously existing statutes directly address a
solution to the medical malpractice crisis, but rather, exist to
194. MINN. STAT. § 544.36 (1984). The statute provides:
In a pleading in a civil action which sets forth an unliquidated claim for
relief, whether an original claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, if a recovery of money is demanded in amount less than $50,000, the amount shall be
stated. If a recovery of money in an amount greater than $50,000 is demanded, the pleading shall state merely that recovery of reasonable damages in amount greater than $50,000 sought.
Id. A similar proposal was discussed by the Legislature in 1976, but was not passed.
See Heins, Statutory Changes in Minnesota Tort Law-1978, HENNEPIN LAW., Sept.-Oct.
1978, at 6.
195. MINN. STAT. § 65A.32 (1984) (amended by section 42 of the bill to include
liability and casualty insurers in the FAIR plain); MINN. STAT. § 70A. 04, subd. 2
(market insurance rates); MINN. STAT. § 70A.06, subd. 1 (every licensed insurer must
file rates with Commissioner before they may become effective and Commissioner
may require supporting data); and MINN. STAT. § 70A. 11, subd. I (if Commissioner
disapproves of rates, policy holder receives a refund plus interest).
196. MINN. STAT. § 147.111 (Supp. 1985). Subdivision I of section 147.11
provides:
Four times each year as prescribed by the Board, each insurer authorized to
sell insurance described in Section 60A.06, subdivision 1, clause (13), and
providing professional liability insurance to physicians . . . against whom
medical malpractice settlements or awards have been made to the plaintiff.
Id.
197. MINN. STAT. § 147.073 (1985).
198. Id.
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provide the Insurance Commissioner and the public with information regarding the medical malpractice insurance industry,
and a mechanism to identify incompetent physicians. Hopefully, the data gathered pursuant to these statutes will shed
some light on the role that the insurance industry plays in the
medical malpractice crisis.
In addition to the previously discussed reporting requirements, the 1986 legislative session renewed the Joint Underwriting Association Act (JUA).' 9 9 The JUA provides that all
insurers authorized to provide personal injury coverage in
Minnesota fund an association created to provide professional
liability insurance to health care providers unable to obtain insurance on the voluntary market. 20 0 Acknowledging that the
insurance crisis is more widespread than just medical malpractice, the legislators promulgated an all-purposeJUA to be used
by "any person or entity" unable to obtain liability insurance
20
through ordinary means. '
V.

THE NATIONAL RESPONSE

In response to the medical malpractice crisis, the "Medical
Offer and Recovery Act" (Act) was introduced in Congress in
the Spring of 1984.202 The Act attempts to add uniformity to
ad hoc state tort reforms. The Act is modeled after a proposal
advanced by Professor Jeffrey O'Connell. 20 3 It adopts a no199. S.F. No. 2078, supra note 152, § 15 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 62F.01.14 (1986)).
200. Id. § 15 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 62F.02, subd. 1 (1986)).
201. Id. § 27 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 621.08 (1986)).
202. H.R. 3084, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. H3053 (1985).
[hereinafter cited as H.R. 3084]. The Act was originally entitled "The Alternative
Liability Act" and was introduced by Representatives W. Hensen Moore (R. La.) and
Richard A. Gephardt (D. Mo.) to the House of Representatives. H.R. 5400, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). Senator David Durenburger (R. Minn.) introduced the Act to
the Senate. S. 2690, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). Several bills were introduced into
Congress as a result of the perceived "crisis." See Studley & Nye, Federal Mlalpractice

Bills, in

LEGISLATURE'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE,

supra note 7, at 22.

203. O'Connell, Offers That Can't be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal Injury Claims by
Defendants Prompt Tender of Claimants'Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 589 (1983).
O'Connell's proposal is intended to eliminate what he perceived as the three major
problems with the present personal injury compensation system: (1) payment based
on fault; (2) payment for pain and suffering; and (3) duplication of recovery because
of the collateral source rule. O'Connell specifically recommends that the medical
malpractice tort system be overhauled to (1) minimize litigation transaction costs
which result from the complexity of proving and defining fault; (2) spread compensation to more victims by reducing their recovery; and (3) enforce internalization of the
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fault scheme permitting a health care provider to extinguish a
patient's common law remedy to sue in tort. The health care
provider is allowed to promptly tender an offer to pay the pa20 4
tient's net economic losses once a patient makes a claim.
The offer itself extinguishes the patient's access to the legal
system, thereby giving the defendant the choice of implementing this Act, or utilizing the existing tort system.2 0 5 The advantages of this proposal to the defendant are that it relieves the
defendant health care provider from paying any non-economic
damages 20 6 or amounts previously paid to the claimant
through collateral sources, 20 7 and that it eliminates the burdens and cost of complex, expensive litigation.
Under the Act, the patient must accept the tendered offer in
total satisfaction of his personal injury claim, because once the
offer is made, the patient is left with no other remedy. The Act
specifically precludes claims for non-economic loss, loss of
earning capacity, 20 8 claims for wrongful death, 20 9 and injuries
21 0
intentionally inflicted by health care providers.
After the offer is made, the claimant is required to submit
proof of wage loss and medical costs, including rehabilitation
costs and replacement services resulting from the claimant's
injuries. 2 1' The claimant is compensated for 100% of his wage
loss, reduced by any substitute work performed. 21 2 The claimant is further compensated for products, services, and accomodations reasonably needed for medical care, remedial
treatment, rehabilitation, and occupational training. 21 3 Replacement services are defined as reasonable expenses incurred by the patient's family in obtaining the ordinary and
reasonable services that the patient provided to the family
costs of the system to those who actually caused the injuries-the health care providers. Id.
204. H.R. 3084, § 1821(a)(l)(A).
205. Id.
206. Id. § 1822(b)(3).
207. Id. (b)(4).
208. Id. (b)(3).
209. Id. § 1821(a)(1)(B)(ii).
210. Id. (a)(3). In the case of an intentionally inflicted injury, the injured individual may elect, within 90 days of the date of an offer tendered by a health care provider, to receive benefits under the Act within 90 days after the date of an offer
tendered by a provider. Id.
211. Id. §§ 1822(d)(1)(2); 1823(a)(1)(A).
212. Id. § 1822(b)(2)(B).
213. Id.
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before the personal injury. 214 The patient may receive services
necessary to treat pain and suffering attributable to the injury,
even though the Act does not provide compensation for pain
and suffering.215

The provider must pay the claimed amount within 30 days of
the submission of proof of cost. 2 16 The amount paid is re-

duced by any funds recovered by the claimant from a collateral
source. 217 Court approval is mandatory for settlements over
$5,000.218 Additionally, a court will be consulted in the event
of a dispute over issues involving discovery, physical or mental
examinations, amount or type of compensation to be paid, or
patient refusal to submit to a type of treatment or surgery recommended by the health care professional.219
The Act encourages states to enact similar legislation. In the
absence of a similar state law, the Act would apply to all federally funded health care programs, such as Medicare, Medicaid,
and VA benefits. The Act further encourages states to establish assigned claims plans with participating insurance companies. 22 0 Failure to do so permits the Secretary of Health &
Human Services to maintain such a program within the
state.22'
Although based on O'Connell's proposal, the Act implements all of the plaintiff-limiting elements, but does not provide a quid pro quo to balance the parties' interests. 222 The
original proposal was amended in 1985 to incorporate two major provisions to alleviate that problem. First, absent any action by the defendant, the patient may initiate arbitration
proceedings to determine whether the defendant should be required to pay economic losses.2 2"

This determination is based

on the fault, if any, of the defendant.2 2 4 This addition is an
attempt to balance the decision-making power between the
physician and the patient, giving the patient a means to trigger
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. (b)(2)(C).
Id. (b)(1)(A).
Id. § 1823(a)(l)(A).
§ 1822(b)(1).
Id. § 1825(a).
Id. § 1824(a)(2); id. (b)(1); id.(b)(3)(c).
Id. § 1826(b)(1).
Id.(b)(2).
§ 1821(a)(1)(B).
Id.
Id.
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his entry into the system. 2 25 Second, if the patient refuses the
defendant's offer to pay economic losses, the patient may sue
in court, but for general damages only. 2 26 In other words, the
patient is no longer foreclosed from a common law remedy,
but if the patient chooses the tort system, the patient loses the
possibility of recovering economic damages. Conversely, if the
patient accepts the offer, the patient foregoes the possibility of
recovering non-economic damages. This latter change is
based on the idea that once a patient has refused a defendant's
offer to pay economic damages, he has "waived" compensation
22 7
for those items.
CONCLUSION

The excessive costs involved in medical malpractice litigation, both monetary and emotional, result from the parties'
failure to work together toward their common goals. Doctors,
insurance companies, and patients share common goals: to reduce the occurrence of medical malpractice; to adequately
compensate victims of medical malpractice; and to decrease
the costs of litigation and medical care. Each interest group,
however, continues to vehemently advocate its own position,
rather than pooling resources with the other groups. The
problem should be approached with a more realistic attitude
toward compromise. The new legislation in Minnesota appears to adopt a more realistic approach. The legislation, however, does not require compromise from all parties involvednotably physicians. Physician discipline was not addressed by
the legislation. There is no question that medical negligence is
occurring, yet none of the recently enacted legislation ad225. In O'Connell's proposal, the patient is guaranteed that if the defendant fails
to tender an offer and the patient brings a lawsuit, the defendant-physician cannot
assert any defenses based on the patient's fault. This proposal further enhances the
patient's position by shifting the burden of proving "no fault" to the defendant-physician once the patient has established a prima facie case of liability.
226. This second change is most likely drawn from a suggestion by O'Connell that
additional elements may be necessary to encourage the use of his new system and
that adding a term such as the second one "would serve as further inducement to
claimants with substantial economic losses to accept settlement.
O'Connell,
supra note 98, at 624.
227. Cf Eisberg & Orenstein, The Federal Alternative Vedical Liability Act: Wroing
Problem, Wrong Solution, MINN. TRIAL LAW. Sept.-Oct. 1984 at 4; Orenstein, Protectitig
Patient's Rights During the So-called M1alpractice Crisis. MINN. TRIM. LAW. May-June 1985
at 10.
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dresses this aspect of the problem. Although many of the Minnesota Medical Malpractice Commission's recommendations
became cornerstones for the recent state tort reform, the recommendations of the Commission addressing this issue were
not adopted. Minnesota is not alone in its reluctance to address physician discipline. Virtually no effective physician disciplinary process is utilized in any of the states.
With time, the effect of the recent statutory changes on medical negligence litigation in Minnesota will be ascertainable.
The information obtained by the Insurance Commissioner will
help to assess the adequacy of the insurance market, and provide consistent accurate data with which to evaluate the effect
of the legislative changes. The lack of objective data in the
past has been a considerable stumbling block in analyzing the
medical malpratice crisis. The absence of physician disciplinary measures, however, guarantees that the incidence of malpractice will not decline. This is the next area of tort reform
which should be addressed by the legislature.
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